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February 1969 The institutional system of the European Com-
munities is difficult to Classify. The Community 
is much more than an intergovenimental organi-
zation: its Institutions have a definite legal status 
and extensive powers of their own.  But nor, on 
the other hand, has it a  "federal government" 
with the national governments and parliaments 
subordinate to it in the spheres of  its jurisdiction. 
It is perhaps safest to be non-committal and leave 
it to future historians to fit the system into one or 
other of  the international lawyers' categories, our-
selves  saying simply that it is  a  "Community" 
system. 
2 The four Institutions 
The merger of the Institutions of the three Communities, 
from July 1967, did not appreciably affect the structure and 
competence of the European Parliament and the Court of 
Justice, which already served all three. On the other hand, 
a single Commission superseded the High Authority of the 
ECSC  and the  Common  Market and Euratom Commis-
sions, and a single Council of  Ministers the ECSC, Common 
Market  and  Euratom  Councils.  The  single  Council  and 
single Commission exercise all the powers and responsibili-
ties formerly vested in their respective predecessors, in the 
same way  and in accordance with  the same rules,  as laid 
down in the three Treaties. 
The merger of the Institutions is no more than a first step 
towards  the setting-up of a  single  European Community, 
governed by  a  single  Treaty which  will  replace  the Paris 
Treaty  (establishing  the  ECSC)  and  the  Rome  Treaties 
(establishing the Common Market and Euratom). 
The work of the Communities is thus discharged by four 
Institutions - the  European Parliament,  the  Council,  the 
Commission and the Court of Justice. 
The Parliament consists of 142 members, appointed by the 
six  national parliaments from among their own members. 
The Court consists of seven judges appointed for terms of 
six years by the common consent of the governments, who 
see to it that the action taken to implement the Treaties is 
in accordance with the rule of law. 
The Council is made up of the representatives of  the govern-
ments of the member states, each government sending one 
of its ministers. Its .membership may thus vary according to 
the matter up for  consideration:  the  Foreign  Minister is 
regarded in a sense as his country's "main" representative 
on the Council, but Council meetings are often attended by 
the Ministers of Agriculture, Transport, Finance, Industry 
and so  on,  either on their own  or alongside  the Foreign 
Minister. 
The merger of the Councils was a very limited operation, 
to a great extent merely endorsing a state of affairs already 
existing in practice:  the EEC and Euratom Councils  had 
been acting pretty well as one ever since 1958, with a single 
Secretariat-General serving both them and the rather more 
separate  ECSC  Council.  The  merger  consisted  merely  in 
unifying the rules of procedure and, in a handful of cases, 
laying down unified rules for the passing of a  number of 
decisions henceforth to be taken by the merged Council on 
behalf of all three Communities (as for instance changing 
the number of judges making up the Court of Justice). 
One development of note, however, was the institutiona-
lization  of the  Committee  of Permanent Representatives. 
The  Coal  and  Steel  Community  had  had  none,  only  a 
Co-ordinating Committee (popularly  known as  "Cocor") 
of civil  servants  from  the  various  capitals  who  did  the 
advance  staff work for  each  Council  meeting.  Even  that 
was  not specifically  provided for  in the  Paris  Treaty.  In 
contrast,  the  Permanent  Representatives  and  their  com-
mittee do, of course, play a notable part in connection with 
the operation of  the Common Market and Euratom Treaties 
- though there, too, all that the two treaties actually say on 
the subject is that the Council's rules of procedure "may" 
provide for the establishment of such a committee. 
The Merger Treaty explicitly institutes a  "committee of 
the Permanent Representatives of the member states", with 
specified terms of reference.  The Committee's powers and 
responsibilities remain unchanged, however, as the terms of 
reference in question are word for word the same as those 
earlier embodied in the Councils' rules of procedure. 
The  merged  Commission  consists  for  the  present  of  14 
members,  to be  reduced to nine  when  the  unified  treaty 
comes into force or three years from July 1967, whichever is 
sooner. Throughout their tenure of office the members must 
act in full independence both of the governments and of the 
Council.  The  Council  cannot  remove  any  member  from 
office; only the Parliament can if  it wishes, by passing a vote 
of censure, compel the Commission to resign in a body. 
The Commission is  appointed on the basis laid down in 
the Rome Treaties, that is, by agreement among the govern-
ments: the more complicated arrangement under the Paris 
Treaty, whereby one member in two was appointed in this 
way  and the  other co-opted by  the sitting members,  has 
been  scrapped.  Answerability  to  the  Parliament  is  in 
accordance with the Common Market and Euratom rules, 
which assign a greater role to the Parliament than do the 
ECSC rules. 
The Council and Commission are assisted by the Economic 
and  Social  Council  for  Common  Market  and  Euratom 
matters and the Consultative Committee for ECSC matters. 
These  advisory  bodies  consist  of representatives  of the 
various  sections  of economic  and  social  life  (e.g.  trade 
associations, unions, farmers). They have to be consulted in 
3 advance  of many decisions,  and they  are  also  of help  in 
associating the employers and workers with the progress of 
the Community. 
How the Council and Commission \Nork 
In implementation of the Treaty of Paris, the Commission 
can  issue  decisions,  recommendations  and·  opinions. 
Decisions are binding in every respect; recommendations are 
binding as  to ends but not as  to means; opinions  are not 
binding. 
The Council acts in ECSC affairs mainly at the request of 
the Commission, either stating its views on particular issues 
or giving the endorsement without which, in certain matters, 
the Commission cannot proceed. 
The Commission's ECSC decisions are mostly individual 
in scope; sometimes, however, they enact general rules, as 
the Commission has power to do this in the same domains 
as are under its jurisdiction for the purposes of individual 
decisions. 
In implementation of the Rome Treaties, the Council and 
Commission issue regulations, directives, decisions, recom-
mendations and opinions. Regulations are of  general applica-
tion, they are binding in every respect and have direct force 
of law in every member state. Directives are binding on the 
member states to which they are addressed as  regards the 
result to be achieved, but leave the mode and means to the 
discretion  of the  national  authorities.  Decisions  may  be 
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addressed  either  to  a  government  or to  an enterprise  or 
private individual; they are binding in every respect on· the 
party or parties named. Recommendations and opinions are 
not binding. 
This discrepancy in terminology between the Paris Treaty 
and the two Rome Treaties is possibly somewhat confusing. 
An ECSC "recommendation" is a binding enactment corres-
ponding to the EEC and Euratom "directive", whereas an 
EEC "recommendation" is  not binding and ranks in this 
regard as no stronger than an "opinion". 
The operation of the ECSC Treaty is centred principally 
on the  Commission  (though  the  Council's  role  in  con-
nections of special importance must not be underrated). In 
EEC  and  Euratom,  the  teaming  of the  Commission  and 
. Council  in  double  harness  provides  the  driving  force,  and 
perhaps the  most original feature,  of the  whole  institutional 
set-up. The Commission's political authority, without which 
the  Commission  could  not properly  fulfil  its  function  in 
relation  to  the  Council,  derives  from  the  fact  that it  is 
answerable  to the Parliament alone.  Lastly,  the Court of 
Justice, as  well as affording the member states and indivi-
duals the assurance of full compliance with the Treaty and 
the  enactments  implementing  it,  plays  a  notable  part in 
ensuring  uniform  interpretation  and  enforcement  of 
Community law. • 
The Commission 
The European Treaties assign the Commission a wide range 
of duties  which  may be roughly grouped as follows.  The 
Commission is the guardian of the Treaties; it is the execu-
tive  arm of the  Communities;  and  it is  the  initiator  of 
Community policy and exponent of  the Community interest 
to the Council. 
The Commission as the guardian of the 
Treaties 
The Commission sees to it that the provisions of  the Treaties, 
and the  decisions  of the Institutions,  are  properly imple-
mented, and that a climate of mutual confidence prevails. 
If it does this watchdog work well, all concerned can carry 
out their obligations to the full without a qualm, knowing 
that their opposite numbers are doing the same  and that 
any  infringement  of the  Treaties  will  be  duly  penalized. 
Conversely; no one can plead breach of obligation on the 
part of others as  a reason for not doing his  own part: if 
anyone is in breach, it is for the Commission, as an impartial 
authority,  to  investigate,  issue  an  objective  ruling,  and 
notify the Government concerned, subject to verification by 
the Court, of the action required to put matters in order. 
The ECSC Treaty too,  before the  others,  required the 
Institutions to discipline infringements,  but the procedure 
involving  governments was  a complex  and cumbrous  one 
which fortunately has seldom had to be invoked. Partly in 
the light of ECSC experience,  the provisions written into 
the Rome Treaties were simpler and stronger, and it is with 
these, of which  a  good deal of use has been made in the 
EEC, that the following account is concerned. 
Where the Commission concludes that the Treaty has been 
infringed - which it may do either on the strength of an 
investigation by its  own  officials,  or at the instance  of a 
Government, or following complaints from individuals - it 
requests  the state in question to submit its comments  or 
counter-arguments  within  a  specified  period  (usually  a 
month or a month and a half). If the member state allows 
the arrangement complained of to continue and its com-
ments do not cause the Commission to change its mind, the 
Commission issues a reasoned opinion with which the state 
must comply by the date set; if the state fails to do so, the 
Commission may refer the matter to the Court of Justice, 
whose  judgment  is  binding  on  both  the  state  and  the 
Institutions. 
These provisions, which give the Institutions a consider-
able  measure  of authority,  are  in  fact  enforced  in  all 
respects.  Thus,  for  example,  during  1967  the  EEC  Com-
mission between January 1 and July 5 instituted proceedings 
for infringement in ten cases, issued one reasoned opinion, 
and shelved some ten cases in which the member states had 
accepted and acted upon its criticism. 
Between July 6 and December 31, the merged Commission 
began proceedings in one  ECSC  and six  EEC cases  (the 
ECSC case was  settled fairly quickly, without recourse to 
the further stages in the Paris Treaty procedure), issued two 
reasoned opinions, and decided to refer to the Court two 
cases taken up earlier by the EEC Commission (which was 
duly done in January 1968); eight cases were shelved. 
Most of the arrangements proceeded against in the first 
few  years  for  infringement of the  EEC Treaty related to 
customs duties and quotas. Nowadays there are cases under 
a great many other Treaty provisions - notably the applica-
tion  of the  agricultural  regulations  - and  the  variety  is 
likely to grow as time goes on and more common policies 
come into effect.  There is little prospect, therefore, of any 
diminution in the Commission's "police" activities. 
The  economic  impact  of the  actionable  arrangements 
themselves was inconsiderable: for the most part they were 
not deliberate attempts to evade the Treaty, but the result 
either  of differences  in interpretation  between  the  Com-
mission and one of the member states, which were settled 
by the Court, or of the kind of mistake that is pretty well 
bound to crop up here and'there when national civil services 
have to adjust to Community procedures. It  can reasonably 
be considered that the infringements committed up to now 
have  not  interfered  to  any  real  extent  with  the  proper 
implementation of the Treaties. 
The Commission as the executive arm of the 
Communities 
The Commission is  directly invested by the Treaties with 
wide  executive  powers; in addition, it now possesses sub-
stantial extra powers conferred on it by the Council, mostly 
in connection with EEC matters, for securing the implemen-
tation of enactments  based  on the Treaty (this  is  termed 
"derived Community law"). 
Both  sets  of powers,  those  stemming  direct  from  the 
Treaties and those made over by the Council, can be sub-
divided under two or three main heads. 
1.  Preparation  of the implementing orders with 
r  sp  ct to  certain  Tr  aty  provisions  or  Council 
enactments. 
The  ECSC  Treaty  gives  the  Commission  particularly 
extensive rule-making powers: its function is declared to be 
5 "to assure  the achievement of the purposes stated in this 
Treaty  within  the  terms  thereof",  and  practically  every 
article invests it with a fresh responsibility and correspond-
ing powers. 
The Rome Treaties also give the Commission direct rule-
making authority, especially the EEC Treaty with regard to 
all matters connected with the establishment of the customs 
union in accordance with the Treaty timetable. Nevertheless, 
it is mainly the powers  conferred by  the Council in con-
nection with  the common policies  - and more  especially 
common agricultural policy - that have so notably enlarged 
the  Commission's  responsibilities  in  the  last  few  years. 
Figures speak louder than words:  during the second half 
of 1967 alone, the merged Commission enacted 827 regula-
tions,  mostly  relating to the  common agricultural policy, 
and during the first half of 1968, 748. 
2.  Application of the Treaties' rules to particular 
cas  s  (wh ther  concerning  a  government  or  an 
nt  rpris  )  and the administration of Community 
funds. 
Here again the Commission plays a particularly prominent 
role in the ECSC: it deals direct with the coal and steel enter-
prises, closely superintends certain aspects of  their activities, 
and can promote  and co-ordinate their capital spending, 
assist  miners  and  steelworkers  facing  redundancy,  grant 
loans and so on. 
Under  the  EEC  Treaty,  it has  many  similar  powers, 
especially  with  regard  to  competition ·(keeping  cartelliza-
tion and market dominance within bounds, similarly setting 
limits  to,  or  doing  away  with,  state  subsidization,  dis-
couraging discriminatory fiscal practices, etc.); in addition, 
it has been given various powers by the Council with respect 
to the common policies, notably on agriculture and transport. 
Under the  Euratom  Treaty  it has  supervisory  respon-
sibilities comparable with those it bears in the coal and steel 
sector,  concerning  such  matters  as  supplies  of  fissile 
materials, protection against radiation, inspection of  nuclear 
plant, and dissemination of technical information. 
Again, the Commission is the Institution responsible for 
the administration of Community funds. The lead was given 
by the ECSC. A levy paid in direct to the Commission on coal 
and steel production assures it of  sizeable financial resources, 
part of which is expended on the tiding-over, retraining and 
redeployment of redundant workers, and another part held 
in reserve  as  backing for the borrowings from  which  the · 
Commission relends  towards the  modernization  of mines 
and steel plants and the redevelopment of areas affected by 
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declining coal or steel production. Between 1952 and the end 
of 1967, the High Authority and its successor, the Commis-
sion,  in  this  way  borrowed  and relent  in  all  some  $720 
million. 
On the Euratom side, the Commission is in charge of a 
Community research and training program. The first five-
year  program  (1958-62)  represented  an  outlay  of $215 
million,  the  second  (1963-67)  an outlay  of $430  million. 
The many projects carried out include the construction of 
four nuclear research stations: at Ispra in Italy, Karlsruhe in 
Germany, Mol in Belgium and Petten in the Netherlands, 
with a total staff of over 2,000. 
These are substantial sums, but they are by no means all. 
First, there is  the European Social Fund, with about $30 
million a year, which part-finances the occupational retrain-
ing and resettlement of  workers. Then there is the European 
Development Fund for the overseas countries and territories 
associated  with  the  Community:  the  first  Development 
Fund (1958-63)  disbursed  $580  million,  while  the  second 
(1964-69) has an appropriation of $730 million,  of which 
$680 million have been set aside for grants and $50 million 
for exceptionally advantageous loans. 
The  European  Agricultural  Guidance  and  Guarantee 
Fund disposes of very much larger amounts still. Under the 
1969 budget, for instance, it is to receive $2,500 million, to 
enable it to cover the agricultural market support costs and 
to furnish assistance up to a ceiling of $285 million towards 
farm modernization schemes. 
3.  Administration of the safeguard claus  s in th 
Treaties. 
These, the so-called "escape clauses", provide that authoriza-
tion may be  given  to waive  the Treaties'  requirements in 
exceptional circumstances. This places a very heavy respon-
sibility on the Commission. Had it been left to the individual 
states  themselves  to  decide  whether  special  problems  or 
circumstances entitled them to by-pass the rules laid down 
in the Treaty or the implementing orders,  sooner or later 
interpretations would have differed,  and before long each 
would have  been doing as  it pleased.  The Treaties wisely 
provide that the Commission and the Commission only, in 
the  strictest independence  and objectivity,  may  authorize 
waivers ("derogations") at the request of a member state, 
having considered all the circumstances and seeking in each 
case to ensure that the operation of the Common Market is 
interfered with as little as possible. The Council has given it 
similar powers in the enactments relating to the common 
policies. Waivers may be of  many kinds, ranging from the fixing of 
tariff  quotas  to  the  exemption  of whole  sectors  of the 
economy from the Treaty's requirements. Most of the cases 
in which the escape clauses  have been invoked have con-
cerned the ECSC and the EEC. However, High Authority 
and Commission action has enabled the waivers to be kept 
strictly limited in scope, so that they have only marginally 
impaired the operation of the Common Market. 
To give  an idea of the scale  on which the Commission 
intervenes with special individual measures and, to a lesser 
extent, waivers and safeguards, it may be noted that, in the 
second  half of 1967  it issued  in all  198  decisions  of this 
nature, and 379 in the first half of 1968. 
Th  Management Committees 
We  have seen how much Council decisions have done, as 
regards the EEC, to extend the field  of the Commission's 
management and administration work by giving the latter 
additional  responsibilities  in  the  enforcement  of derived 
Community law.  In many cases,  the Council was  anxious 
that the powers so  conferred should be  exercised in close 
consultation with the member governments, and accordingly 
various  committees  of  government  representatives  are 
attached to the Commission. Some .are< purely consultative 
in character,  but the most original,  and in the event the 
most valuable, part of the system is the array of "Manage-
ment Committees" concerned with agricultural marketing, 
one committee for each main category of products. 
The  procedure  is  that  the  implementing  measure  the 
Commission intends to enact is submitted in draft form to 
the appropriate Management Committee, which then gives 
its opinion, arrived at by voting weighted in the same way 
as in the Council. 
The  committee's  opinion  is  not  binding  on the  Com-
mission, which notes the contents but remains entirely free 
to decide for itself; the measure once enacted by it there-
upon has direct force of law.  However, if the opinion has 
been given by qualified majority (12 votes out of 17) and the 
Commission nevertheless takes a different stand, the matter 
goes  before  the  Council,  which  may  within  one  month 
:reverse the Commission's decision. If on the other hand the 
Commission's  decision  is  in  line  with  the  committee's 
opinion, or if no opinion has been forthcoming (the com-
mittee having failed to muster a qualified majority one way 
or the other), that decision is final and no appeal can lie to 
the Council. 
The  Management  Committee  procedure  is  extensively 
employed, and works extremely well. In the 14 months from 
March 1967 to April 1968, for example, over 200 meetings 
of  the various Management Committees were held, following 
which  nearly  600  Commission  regulations  and  decisions 
were adopted. More striking still, not one of these rated an 
adverse opinion and had to go to the Council; indeed, since 
the system was introduced in June 1962, only four measures 
have been referred to the Council, and of those the Council 
amended only one. 
This is  eloquent of the atmosphere of co-operation and 
mutual confidence which -has  developed in the committees 
between  the  Commission's  departments  and the  national 
departments which subsequently enforce the Commission's 
enactments. 
The function of the Management Committees is to act as 
a kind of alarm mechanism. When the Commission differs 
from  an opinion given  by a  qualified  majority - that is, 
voted for by most of the Government representatives - this 
is a clear indication of a difficult situation or a serious prob-
lem,  which  it is  only  right  and proper that the  Council 
should deliberate itself. That it is seldom called upon to do 
so is proof that the system works and the parties to it are 
substantially in agreement. 
The Management Committees having been such a success, 
similar arrangements have been introduced in the last few 
years in other fields  also. Thus, committees of government 
representatives have been set up to help manage the imple-
mentation  of the  common  customs  tariff  following  the 
establishment of the customs union on July  1,  1968,  and 
others  are  planned to handle  activity  in connection with 
technical standards (quality standards, safety rules and so 
on). Basically, the system will be the same as for the agricul-
tural Management Committees, though the conditions under 
which the Council may be called upon to act will be different, 
according  to  the  particular  features  of each  case.  One 
arrangement  favoured  by  the  Commission,  and  already 
adopted in a number of instances, is that if the committee 
gives  an adverse  opinion or no  opinion at all,  the  Com-
mission proposal in question goes before the Council, but 
that, if  the committee has not produced an opinion voted by 
qualified majority by a given deadline (three months, as a 
rule) the Commission issues its decision alone. It  is too soon 
to judge as to the effectiveness of this new type of arrange-
ment, as it was only introduced so recently. 
7 Th  Commission and the coherence of 
Community policy 
The Commission is the initiator of Community policy and 
exponent of the Community interest, and is responsible for 
seeing  that  Community  policy  forms  a  single  consistent 
whole. 
In the  more limited fields  of ECSC  and Euratom,  the 
High Authority and the Euratom Commission had more 
to do in the way of administration and supervision and less 
in the way of framing common policies, it being peculiarly 
difficult  to  hammer  out  such  policies  for  Communities 
having jurisdiction only  over specific sectors.  The merged 
Commission made it one of its first concerns, now that the 
relevant powers and responsibilities had been concentrated 
in its hands, to reactivate a number of common policies -
industrial policy, energy policy, research and technological 
policy - which despite valuable achievements in the early 
stages had been hanging fire  in consequence of the fact of 
there being three separate Executives. 
The initiating of common policies will thus be the single 
Commission's most important function, just as, and indeed 
still more than, it was  the  EEC Commission's.  This it is 
doing in the closest cooperation with the Council,  so  that 
any account of this facet of its work is at the same time in 
effect  an  account  of the  function  and  operation  of the 
Council also. 
Why  did the  EEC  Commission  devote  itself from  the 
outset primarily to the framing of common policies? Quite 
apart from the dictates of economics, because the Common 
Market Treaty is what may be termed an "outline treaty", 
unlike  its  ECSC  and  Euratom  counterparts,  which  are 
"code-of-rules  treaties".  For,  whereas  the  latter  two  lay 
down in careful detail exactly what rules are to be applied 
and what tasks performed in their respective  spheres,  the 
Common Market Treaty, apart from its "automatic" pro-
visions  on the dismantling of tariffs  and quotas, confines 
itself to sketching out in general terms the policy lines to be 
pursued in the main areas of economic activity, leaving it 
to  the  Community  Institutions,  and  more  especially  the 
Council and Commission in conjunction with the Parliament, 
to work out the actual arrangements the Community is to 
establish. 
8 
In a sense, everything to do with the economic union has 
been left blank in the Treaty, but the blanks can be filled in 
by the Institutions without need for fresh treaties or fresh 
parliamentary ratification. The measures the Institutions are 
empowered  to  bring  in  are  full-scale  "European  laws", 
directly enforceable in all the member states and capable of 
producing radical changes in the sectors concerned. To give 
an example, the great corpus of "European laws" on agri-
culture, promulgated from 1962 onwards, is comparable in 
scope to the corpus of rules contained in the ECSC Treaty. 
It is  worth pausing a moment to consider the view fre-
quently  voiced  that the  Common  Market Treaty  is  less 
supranational, or more intergovernmental, than the ECSC 
Treaty. This is to a great extent a mistaken approach. The 
"code-of-rules" Coal and Steel Treaty laid down the High 
Authority's  powers  of implementation in detail,  but not 
until the requisite common policies have been agreed can it 
be known what powers of implementation the Commission  • 
holds in each particular sector covered by the EEC Treaty. 
Experience with regard to cartels and agriculture has shown 
us that these powers are similar to those stemming from the 
ECSC Treaty. It should be added, however, that the Paris 
Treaty did, right from the start, assure the High Authority, 
and now assures the Commission, of  an independent income 
from the ECSC levy, with the aid of  which the Executive has 
been able to do a good deal on the financial and social side, 
whereas the corresponding provision in the EEC Treaty has 
up to now remained a dead letter, the Council not having 
agreed to the implementing measures proposed by the EEC 
Commission in 1965. 
Actually, the Paris and Rome Treaties are based on the 
same principles and purport to set up parallel institutional 
systems. But the EEC Treaty, evolving as it goes along and 
allowing its makers to work out empirically when the time 
comes the arrangement best suited to a particular sector or 
situation, has jarred the less on those not fully converted to 
the Community idea, while the balance which it represents 
between the powers of the national Governments and the 
powers of  the European Institutions is more clearly apparent 
to those who are just beginning to know and to learn to live 
with  the  Communities.  For all  the  difficulties  the  EEC 
has encountered, this)(  none the less a fact. The Commission-Council dialogue 
The merged Institutions have taken over from their predeces-
sors  the  work  of building  up  the  fabric  of European 
economic union: the Treaties laid the foundations, but the 
structure  had  still  to  be  erected.  In  addition,  once  the 
fabric  is  in  place  for  a  particular  sector,  they  have  to 
formulate and implement day by day the Community policy 
that is to take the place of the six national policies. 
Under  the  ECSC  Treaty,  the  dialogue  between  Com-
mission  and Council existed,  but on a limited scale  only. 
The Commission (or the High Authority,  as  it then was) 
bore a great deal of the responsibility for the implementa-
tion of  the Treaty, but the Council's endorsement-in some 
cases its unanimous endorsement - was required neverthe-
less  for  certain  particularly  important  decisions,  as  for 
instance in the event of "manifest crisis" or if it was desired 
to amend the Treaty. The form is of course not the same as 
in the  Rome Treaties.  In the  ECSC,  the  High Authority 
(now the Commission) decides with the Council's endorse-
ment; in the EEC and Euratom, the Council decides on the 
basis of the Commission's proposal. The difference is  not 
without its implications from the policymaking standpoint, 
but in both cases the two Institutions have their part to play 
before a decision can be finally adopted. 
Under  the  Rome  Treaties,  any  measure  of  general 
application or of a  certain level  of importance has to be 
enacted by the Council of  Ministers, but except in a very few 
cases the Council can only proceed upon proposal by the 
Commission. The Commission has thus a permanent duty 
to initiate action. If it submits no proposals, the Council is 
paralysed and the forward march of the Community comes 
to a halt-in agriculture, in transport, in commercial policy, 
in harmonization of laws,  or whatever the field  concerned 
may be. 
As an indication of the volume of the Commission's and 
Council's work under the three Treaties, it may be mentioned 
that in the first half of 1967 the EEC Commission laid before 
the Council  143  proposals and 53  drafts and other docu-
ments of  various kinds, and the Euratom Commission seven 
proposals and 22  other documents, while a score or so of 
matters were  referred to it by the High Authority. In the 
second half of 1967 the merged Commission submitted 102 
proposals and 66 drafts and other documents. 
During the first half of 1967 the EEC Council, in addition 
to dealing with purely procedural matters and with budgets 
and  financial  regulations,  adopted  106  regulations,  six 
directives,  10  decisions  and the  important first  medium-
term economic program; the Euratom Council adopted two 
regulations and three decisions, and the ECSC Council gave 
28 endorsements and two consultations. In the second half 
of  the year, the merged Council adopted 74 regulations, four 
directives,  11  decisions and one recommendation, and also 
gave  two  endorsements  and  one  consultation  under  the 
ECSC Treaty. 
As is apparent, the Rome Treaty procedure is  of far the 
commoner occurrence in. the dealings between the merged 
Commission  and  the  merged  Council.  A  few  further 
particulars as to its operation may therefore be in order. 
A proposal having been lodged, a dialogue begins between 
the Ministers of  the Council, putting their national points of 
view, and the Commission, in its capacity as the European 
body upholding the interest of the Community as a whole 
and seeking European solutions to common problems. 
There might seem to be some risk of the dialogue being 
distorted  by  the Commission's  being less  strongly placed 
than the  governments  with  the  weight  of their  sovereign 
authority behind them.  However,  the Rome Treaties con-
trive rather ingeniously to ensure that the two are evenly 
matched. 
In the Commission's favour there is, for a start, the fact 
that it draws up the proposal the Council is to deliberate-
and only  on the  basis  of that proposal can the  Council 
deliberate at all. But its position is buttressed in other ways 
too. 
Article  149  EEC (119  Euratom),  one  of the  key  com-
ponents in the institutional structure, provides that "when, 
pursuant to this Treaty, the Council acts on a proposal of 
the  Commission,  it shall,  where  the  amendment ·of such 
proposal is  involved,  act  only by means  of a  unanimous 
vote". 
If the Ministers are unanimous, they can therefore decide 
on their own authority, even should their decision be counter 
to the Commission's proposal. This is fair enough, since the 
Council is then expressing the united view of all the govern-
ments together. 
On the other hand, they can decide by a majority only if 
their decision is in line with the Commission's proposal. In 
other  words,  if the  member  states  are  not at  one,  they 
cannot take a majority decision unless it entails accepting 
the proposal in  toto,  without amendment:  only the Com-
mission  itself  can  amend  it.  Thus,  in  cases  where  the 
majority rule applies, the position is that either the Council 
adopts the Commission's proposal as it stands, by a majority, 
or it decides against the proposal, unanimously, or it fails 
to come to a  decision at all.  So  the Commission does. in 
9 fact have genuine bargaining power in the Council. Dialogue 
can  be  conducted, and is· indeed conducted on the  Com-
mission's ·own ground. 
Now  this  dialogue  has  a  momentum  of its  own.  The 
application of the majority rule, as fairly substantial EEC 
experience has shown, does not mean that a state is liable 
to find itself outvoted at the drop of a hat. The Commission 
in drawing up its proposal will have been careful to take into 
account the often widely-varying interests of the individual 
states and seek to establish where the general interest lies. 
As is usual in a club of so few members, both the members 
of the Council and the Commission like to be in agreement 
if they can. Hence, if faced with the prospect of being out-
voted, a minister may feel it best to abandon an extreme or 
isolated· position, while for the sake of good relations the 
Commission, and those of the Council who are in favour of 
its proposal, may make the necessary efforts to help secure 
a rapprochement. The result - a trifle paradoxical, but amply 
confirmed in practice - is that the majority rule makes for 
much easier and quicker arrival at unanimity. In this delicate 
interplay of forces, the Commission is always in a position 
to sway the outcome. 
The Commission is thus centrally placed in the Council, 
able regularly to act as "honest broker" among the Govern-
ments, and to apply the prompting and pressure required to 
evolve formulas acceptable all round. 
The implications for  policymaking are  more important 
still. The Commission's proposals embody a policy prepared 
by it on the basis purely of the interest of the Community 
as  a whole.  The fact that the Commission is there to stay 
throughout its term of office ensures the continuity of that 
policy,  and the Council can pronounce only on the Com-
mission's proposed enactments for putting the policy into 
effect.  There is therefore no danger that the Council might 
adopt  conflicting  proposals  on  different  issues  in  conse-
quence  of shifting  majorities  arising  out  of alliances  of 
interests or contests of influence among Governments. 
Nor can it happen that a  majority of the Council,  un-
backed by  the Commission,  can impose  on a  recalcitrant 
state a measure gravely deleterious to that state's essential 
interests. If  the Commission does its job properly, it can be 
no  party  to  such  a  proceeding.  Its  role  thus  affords  an 
important safeguard, more especially to the smaller member 
states, and they in particular have always set great store by 
this. 
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Unanimity and majority voting 
Under  the  Paris  Treaty,  as  we  have  seen,  the  Council's 
endorsement is required only in a limited number of cases; 
in some it has to be unanimous, but in most it can be given 
by a majority vote. This system has been duly adhered to 
since  the  Treaty  came ·into  force.  When  the  Council,  in 
May 1959, refused its consent to the High Authority's plan 
to declare  a  state  of "manifest crisis"  in the coal  sector 
(ECSC was then going through one of  its periods of  greatest 
difficulty), the case was, it should be noted, one calling for a 
majority and not a unanimous endorsement: the Council's 
refusal was due therefore not to a solitary veto but to the 
fact that there was not a majority in favour. 
In the EEC, during the first two stages of  the transitional 
period, from 1958 to the end of 1965, most Council decisions 
had to be unanimous, so that the procedure described above 
was  not often  needed.  Nevertheless,  thanks to the Com-. 
munity spirit of the members  of the Council,  and to the 
collective  authority  of  the  Commission  and  the  high 
personal  repute  of its  members,  the  dialogue invariably 
went off smoothly and the Commission was able to play its 
part of instigator and conciliator to the full. 
The scheduled move into the third stage,  on January 1, 
1966,  was  to have brought a major extension in the scope 
for majority decisions, but at this point the majority principle 
became the focus  of a Community crisis. Was it tolerable, 
one  of the  governments  demanded,  that a  member  state 
should be overruled by the rest where one of its essential 
interests was at stake? 
This is  not a  question that can be answered merely by 
citing the relevant provisions,  nor indeed is  it possible to 
define  objectively what constitutes an "essential interest". 
Besides,  if for the sake of argument the .  matter is  viewed 
purely in terms of interests, it could well  be that in fields 
where all the member states had forgone their freedom of 
action for the benefit of the Community, the vetoing of a 
Community  decision  for  the  sake  of a  national  interest 
would  prejudice  the  essential  interests  of other  member 
states,  which  would  be  harmed  by  the  paralysis  of the 
Community. On the other hand, a state accepting the Com-
munity system and relying on its inner logic, its Institutions 
and their rules and traditions can be assured that these will 
furnish all reasonable safeguards. 
The general interest of the Community must of necessity 
take account of any essential interest of one of its members. 
It is  the Institutions' bounden duty, therefore, to consider such  an  interest  to  the  full.  The  close  union  of the  six 
nations which the Community exists to bring about would 
in any case not be feasible if one of those nations suffered 
grave injury to its essential interests. Moreover, the system 
of deliberation in the Council just described is calculated to 
achieve the broadest possible measure of agreement.  Con-
versely, even where unanimity is the rule, no member of a 
Community can disregard the general interest in assessing 
his  own:  unanimity  in a  Community  cannot be  equated 
with an absolute right of veto. 
Thus, in a living Community, abuse of majority voting -
and probably abuse of unanimity too - is a theoretical risk 
which,  with  the  Community's  inner  bonds  drawing  ever 
closer as it moves forward, is becoming less and less likely 
to materialize,  while  the  possibility  of majority  decisions 
renders the whole system more flexible and more dynamic. 
To have faith in the future, faith in the Institutions' and 
governments' good sense and desire to work amicably to-
gether, is the only possible answer. After all, the six Foreign 
Ministers in session in Luxembourg on January 28,  1966, 
after months of  crisis and difficult debate, had in the end to 
acknowledge that failure to agree on the application of the 
majority rule  was  no reason for  not continuing with  the 
joint venture. 
11 The European Parliament 
For the dialogue between Commission and Council to be a 
genuine one, it is necessary that the Commission should be 
genuinely  independent.  To this  end,  the Treaties make it 
answerable to the European Parliament alone. 
The Parliament is  so  constituted as to be in fact  truly 
Community  in  character,  fully  integrated.  There  are  no 
national  sections;  there  are  only  European-level  political 
groups. The Parliament keeps constant watch on the Com-
mission's doings,  making sure that it faithfully  represents 
the Community interest, ready at any time to call it to order 
if it gives the impression of yielding to blandishments from 
the  governments  or  from  a  particular  government.  In 
addition, the Parliament has to be expressly consulted on 
the  Commission's  more  important  proposals  under  the 
Rome Treaties before these go to the Council. 
The Parliament's various committees play a notable part 
in  this  connection.  The  House  itself normally  meets  in 
ordinary session only six times a year, for a week at a time 
(plus, on occasion, a number of extraordinary sessions of a 
day or two).  Between sessions,  each of the parliamentary 
committees meets at least once, and usually more, and the 
appropriate member of the Commission appears before it 
to give an account of  the decisions taken by the Commission, 
the  decisions  referred  to  the  Council,  and  the  position 
adopted by the Commission vis-a-vis the Council. 
The committees thus follow developments in detail, and 
as they meet in camera they can be told a great deal, includ-
ing even confidential matter. Their work has done much to 
increase  the  Parliament's  influence  in  the  day-to-day 
handling of affairs. 
The written questions which Members of Parliament can 
put to  the  Commission  (and  also  to  the  Council)  offer 
another  means  of  control  which  is  being  increasingly 
resorted to.  During the  parliamentary  year  1967-68,  113 
written questions were  put to the three Executives in the 
first six months (105  to the EEC Commission, four to the 
Euratom Commission and four to the High Authority) and 
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210 to the merged Commission in the second, making 315 
altogether over the year. In the current parliamentary year, 
1968-69, the number will probably be larger still. 
Also  in  1967-68,  the  Council  received  ten  written 
questions during the first half-year and 14 during the second, 
making 24 in all, and three written questions were addressed 
to the Council and Commission jointly. 
By means of oral questions put in plenary session of the 
House (which may or may not be followed  by a  debate), 
the Parliament is enabled to keep a careful eye on develop-
ments in European policy, both generally and with respect 
to particular sectors,  and to comment direct at the time, 
sidestepping  the  sometimes  rather unwieldy  procedure  of 
statements by the Commission, sending to committee, and 
reports to the full  House.  The Parliament has in the last 
few  years  been  making more  and more  use  of this  very 
flexible  and effective device, putting oral questions both to 
the Commission and to the Council (though it does some-
times happen that the Council is  not able to reply by the 
time indicated). 
In the  parliamentary  year  1967-68  a  total  of 15  oral 
questions, with or without ensuing debate, were put to the 
three  Executives  and,  after  July  1967,  the  merged  Com-
mission, and three to the Council; the 1968-69 figure  will 
certainly be higher. 
With the  Community's responsibilities  growing  as  they 
are  doing,  it is  becoming  absolutely  essential  that steps 
should be taken in the near future to give  the Parliament 
wider  powers  and  to  make  it  more  representative,  for 
example  by  causing  it to  be  elected  by  direct  universal 
suffrage. This is bound to come, despite the hesitations that 
have prevented it up to now.  . 
The control exercised by the Parliament thus underpins 
the independence of the Commission, thanks to which the 
Council  has  the  advantages  of  the  majority  principle 
and  is  shielded  as  far  as  may  be  from  such  risks  as  it 
entails. The Court of Justice 
By reason of the substantial powers of direct· enforcement 
vested  in  the  High  Authority  for  the  operation  of the 
common market ·for coal  and steel,  the  ECSC  Court of 
Justice was mainly called upon to handle appeals to it by 
coal  and  steel  enterprises.  In  1958,  the  Rome  Treaties 
instituted in its stead a single Court of Justice of the Euro-
pean Communities:  since  they,  and particularly the EEC 
Treaty,  required  for  their  implementation  a  considerable 
measure of government action, the first cases coming before 
the new  Court were  brought by  the  Commission against 
the  governments  for  infringements  of the Treaties.  Later 
there came also appeals by governments  against decisions 
of the Commission, and appeals by individuals. 
The Court's procedure for dealing with cases of this kind 
is broadly similar to that of the highest courts of appeal of 
the member states. Its judgments not only settle the particu-
lar matters  at issue,  but also  lay  down  the  precise  con-
struction to be placed on disputed passages in the Treaties, 
thereby  affording  clarification  and  guidance  as  to  their 
implementation. 
In recent years,  over and above this function of making 
sure that Community enactments are good law, the Court 
has increasingly  been  called  upon to  sit  on interlocutory 
appeals  from  national courts.  Community law  proper as 
contained in the  Treaties,  and the  corpus  of enactments 
based on the Treaties (derived Community law), are becom-
ing more and more interwoven with the municipal law of 
the  individual  member  countries,  and consequently  their 
implementation is occupying a growing part of the national 
courts' attention.  By  the end of 1967,  the national courts 
had handed down nearly 200  decisions having to do with 
Community law under the EEC and ECSC Treaties. (So far 
there have been none concerning the Euratom Treaty, owing 
to its rather special character.) 
Interlocutory referrals to the Court of Justice are requests 
to it to  rule  as  to  the  interpretation  or applicability  of 
particular portions  of Community law (in the ECSC, the 
applicability of Commission and Council enactments only). 
Their steadily-growing numbers bears witness to the closer 
interaction in matters of litigation between the European 
Court and the national courts, which is enabling Community 
law to be uniformly enforced in all the member countries 
and a consistent body of European case law built up. 
A few figures may serve to indicate the extent of the Court 
of Justice's  work.  Between  1952,  when  the ECSC Treaty 
came  into  force,  and the  end  of 1967,  381  actions  were 
lodged, not counting administrative actions by Community 
officials in connection with the staff rules and regulations. 
Of this total,  109 related to the EEC Treaty: of these just 
under half were  interlocutory  referrals,  over  30  per cent 
actions  by individuals,  and the  remainder actions by the 
Commission or by governments.  Of the  272  ECSC cases 
brought  between  1952  and  1967,  251  were  instituted  by 
individuals and enterprises, 20 by governments, and one by 
the High Authority. No actions have been brought to date 
with respect to Euratom.(l) 
(1) A document on the work of the Court of Justice and explaining 
in more detail the points made in this section will be published dur-
ing 1969. 
13 Working methods 
From this brief account of  the main duties of  the Institutions, 
their  relation to  one  another and the  balance  of powers 
among them, we now turn to their methods. 
How does the Commission work  7 
Departments of the Commission 
The merged Commission's departments consist of the com-
bined departments of the High Authority of ECSC and of 
the EEC and Euratom Commissions. There are a Secretariat-
General,  a  Legal  Department,  a  Statistical  Office,  20 
Directorates-General,  and  a  small  number  of specialized 
services.  The staff numbers  some  4,900  in  all  (1968),  in-
cluding 1,400 in the Administrative grades and 460  trans-
lators and interpreters. They are divided between the two 
provisional seats of the Community, Brussels and Luxem-
bourg, about 1,000 officials working in the latter. In addition 
there  is  the  Euratom  research  budget's  establishment  of 
approximately  2,700,  most  of them  at  Euratom's  four 
research centres. 
The operating expenses of the departments of the Com-
mission and the other three Institutions are at present (1968) 
running at about $110 million a year. 
Each of the  14  Members  of the  Commission has  been 
made specially  responsible  for  one  or more of the  Com-
munity's main fields  of activity (external relations, agricul-
ture,  social  affairs  and  so  on),  and  has  under  him  the 
Directorate, or Directorates-General, dealing with these. 
Op  ration of the Commission 
By the terms of the Treaties, the Commission's operation is 
"collegiate": that is, the Commission must itself, as a body, 
adopt the  various  measures  - viz.  regulations,  decisions, 
proposals to the Council, etc. - incumbent on it under the 
Treaties  or implementing  orders,  and  cannot,  therefore, 
delegate to a member in his particular sphere powers giving 
him a degree of independence comparable to that of,  say, 
a minister in his department. Only very limited delegations 
of powers are granted, for the issuance of strictly technical 
implementing  measures  in  line  with  the  Commission's 
agreed approach, such  as  the day-to-day fixing  of certain 
agricultural levies. 
Various procedural devices have been adopted to ensure 
that the  system  does  not allow  log-jams  to  build· up in 
Commission  business.  A  number  of working  parties  of 
members  of the Commission have been  set up to do  the 
groundwork for the Commission's proceedings in matters 
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where  the  responsibilities  of two  or  more  members  and 
departments interlock, as for instance the industrial affairs 
group and the external relations and development aid group. 
The more technical items  on the  Commission's agenda 
are  considered  at  a  weekly  meeting  of  the  members' 
immediate subordinates, the Chief Executive Assistants, in 
order  to  simplify  and  speed  up  the  proceedings.  Fairly 
straightforward matters are to a great extent dealt with by 
means of the "written procedure" earlier employed by the 
EEC Commission: the members are sent the particulars and 
the  text  of the  proposed  decision,  and if within  a  given 
period (usually  one week)  they  have  not entered  reserva-
tions or objections the proposal is taken as adopted.  1,075 
written procedures were instituted during the second half of 
1967, and 1,212 during the first half of 1968. 
Only issues of some importance, therefore, actually figure 
on the agenda of the Commission itself, which meets each 
week for at least one whole day. 
When discussing particularly delicate matters, the mem-
bers of the Commission sit alone, with no officials present 
except the Secretary-General and Deputy Secretary-General. 
In other cases,  the  officials  responsible  may be  called in. 
Although its decisions can be taken by a majority, many are 
in  fact  unanimous.  Where  a  vote  is  taken,  the  minority 
always  abides  by  the  majority  decision,  which  thereupon 
constitutes the stance of the whole Commission. 
How the Commission draws up  its decision  and 
proposals 
The  Commission  proceeds  in  two  quite  different  ways, 
according as it is concerned to establish the broad outlines 
of the policy it intends to pursue in a particular field,  or to 
fix  the practical details of that policy as well as  of various 
measures of  a more technical nature, not so much connected 
with policy as such. 
In  establishing  actual  policy,  the  Commission,  after 
extensive  consultations  with  political  circles,  top  civil 
servants and employers' and workers' organizations, settles 
down to working out its final position with the assistance of 
its own departments only. This involves a series of  meetings, 
often numerous and prolonged, with weeks of careful con-
sideration intervening between  one  reading and the next. 
It was  on this  basis,  for  instance,  that the merged  Com-
mission  prepared  its  opinion  on  the  British  and  other 
applications  for  membership,  its  report  on  Community 
nuclear policy,  and its  proposals  on the reform  of Com-
munity agriculture. • 
Once the main lines of  its policy have been agreed, on the 
other hand, the Commission has systematic recourse to the 
cooperation  of experts  in  the  member  countries  in  the 
working-out of  the practical particulars of  the arrangements 
to  be  adopted  or  the  proposals  to  be  submitted.  The 
appropriate Commission departments convene meetings of 
the experts designated by the national civil  service depart-
ments concerned, with a Commission official in the chair. 
The experts' contributions do not commit their respective 
Governments, but as they are sufficiently well-informed as 
to the latter's wishes  and general  position,  they  can give 
their  Commission  counterparts  all  relevant  guidance  in 
their efforts  to arrive  at formulas  calculated  to meet  the 
requirements of the case and to be generally acceptable to 
the six Governments. 
There are a very great many of these meetings of experts, 
and consequently  more  and  more  national  civil  servants 
every year are receiving what can fairly be called a European 
training, while at the same time a  departmental-level dia-
logue is being carried on between European and government 
officials.  In  addition,  members  of  the  Commission  or 
officials from their departments have regular meetings with 
leading representatives of trade unions, employers' federa-
tions,  farmers'  associations,  groups of dealers  and so  on, 
formed in sets of six within the Community. 
Some of these meetings have been institutionalized: thus 
the Council, at the Commission's proposal, has set up, among 
others, a Short-Term Economic Policy Committee, a Budge-
tary-Policy  Committee, a  Medium-Term Economic Policy 
Committee and a  Nuclear-Research Advisory Committee, 
consisting of high-level  government representatives,  and a 
Committee  on Vocational  Training and a  Committee  on 
the Free Movement of Workers, consisting of both govern-
ment experts and representatives of  workers' and employers' 
organizations.  The  Commission  itself  has  established  a 
number  of advisory  committees  of the  heads  of all  the 
representative  bodies  for  a  particular  sector,  to  deal  for 
example with the main agricultural production sectors  or 
with certain specific social problems. 
In the final stage, the results of these various preparatory 
proceedings  are  laid before  the  Commission,  which  then 
takes up>  its stand. Such is the process by which the Com-
mission frames its proposals for sending to the Council, and 
also, in many cases, regulations or decisions which it could 
issue  on  its  own  but has  thought  well  to  prepare  with 
the  cooperation  of  the  member  countries'  own  civil 
servants. 
How does the Council work? 
Upon receiving from the Commission either a memorandum 
of general scope  or a  proposal on a particular point, the 
Council first  has the matter gone into either by a  special 
committee of  senior officials (such as for instance the Special 
Committee  on Agriculture)  or  by  one  of its  permanent 
working parties (of which there is one for each of the Com-
munity's main fields of  activity). The work of  these bodies is 
coordinated by the Committee  of Permanent Representa-
tives to which reference has already been made. The member 
countries' Permanent Representatives to the Communities 
have the rank of ambassador. 
The  Commission  is  represented  at all  meetings  of the 
working parties, the special committees and the Permanent 
Representatives' Committee, so  that the dialogue begun at 
national-expert level can there be carried on higher up the 
scale, with accredited officials holding instructions from their 
governments. 
The Council's decisions can be taken only by the ministers 
themselves. However, on less important matters, where the 
six Permanent Representatives and the Commission's repre-
sentative  are  unanimously  agreed,  the  decision  will  be 
adopted without debate.  On the other hand, all important 
questions,  and  those  having  political  implications,  are 
discussed in detail in the Council between the ministers and 
the members of the Commission, who attend as of right: it 
is then that the procedures just described come into play. 
The Council's meetings are not merely a matter of form, 
as ministerial meetings in other international organizations 
sometimes  are:  they  are  working sessions  in  which  ding-
dong debate is frequently the order of the day and the out-
come  may  well  hang long in the  balance.  They  are con-
stantly being held, and often last some considerable time. 
In the first half of 1967, the three Councils held a total of 
26 meetings (13 on EEC matters, one on Euratom and seven 
on EEC and Euratom together,  plus five  meetings  of the 
ECSC Council), taking 44  days in all; in the second half-
year, the merged Council held 21  meetings, taking 31-! days. 
Similarly, in the first half of 1967, the Permanent Repre-
sentatives' Committee (EEC and Euratom) was  in session 
for 64 days altogether, at 24 meetings, and the ECSC Co-
ordinating Committee for 16 days at 16 meetings; in the six 
months that followed, the single Permanent Representatives' 
Committee met 20 times and totalled 52 days in session. 
When  decision  is  impending  on a  particularly. difficult 
problem,  the  Council  may  have  to  hold  a  "marathon". 
15 Everyone in the Communities remembers the marathon on 
the agricultural regulations at the end of 1961 and beginning 
of 1962,  which  lasted  nearly  three  weeks.  This  was  the 
longest occasion of its kind, but not the only one. 
Such then is the operation of the Council of Ministers and 
the  Commission,  and the  Community  generally.  Broadly 
summed  up,  the  mode  of approach  of the  Community 
Institutions may be said to be characterized by three out-
standing features. 
Firstly, the Institutions, and the Commission in particular, 
are no ivory tower. On the contrary, they are a forum for 
constant exchanges of views and suggestions from govern-
ments and civil services, members of the European Parlia-
ment and representatives of associations and federations in 
the different sectors of the economy. 
Secondly, there are strict legal rules in force which have 
to be faithfully obeyed, but at the same time the ongoing 
dialogue  in  progress  creates  the  necessary  Community-
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mindedness and mutual trust to ensure the proper degree of 
flexibility. 
•  And lastly, the economic operators' groups, the Parlia-
ment,  the  national  civil  services  and  the  ministers  have 
genuine confidence in the Commission's impartiality. 
Now that the Common Market and Euratom have been 
in being for ten years,  and the European Coal and Steel 
Community for longer still, and have successfully weathered 
a number of crises, it would seem clear that the Community 
system is  in fact an effective  one, and that its Institutions 
are firmly  established and have taken root among the six 
nations. How fast it develops has of  course always depended 
on how fast the member governments and nations wish it 
to develop.  Nevertheless, for so long as fulfilment of their 
Treaty obligations remains basic to the policy of  them all, we 
may  rest  assured  that  whatever  difficulties,  of whatever 
magnitude, may arise in the future can in the end be solved, 
and  the  full  and  final  establishment  of  the  European 
Communities at long last achieved. Community Topics 
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